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AbsTrACT
In her lead article in this special issue, Monica Greco 
(2018) offers the concept of participating bodies as a 
’possibility of conceiving bodies themselves—and bodily 
events such as disease/illness—as expressing values 
and perhaps even socially meaningful "preferences"’. 
Such a position seeks to avoid capitulation to a) 
an image of bodily processes as without values or 
responsiveness, object rather than participant; b) an 
image of human agents as unitary, self-knowing, 
sovereign choosers—unless ill. This article will explore 
this perspective as applied to the idea of coping. The 
article will explore strategies of everyday living, through 
particular consideration of Lauren Berlant’s reading 
of Two Girls, Fat and Thin by Mary Gaitskill. In her 
interpretation of the novel, Berlant assesses the kinds 
of problems for subjects and bodies that may be solved 
or managed through participation in or refraining from 
participation in thinking, food or sex. The account of 
coping and embodiment in Berlant’s reflections will 
then be placed in dialogue with findings by Alexandra 
Michel, who watched the process of physical burnout 
in investment banking associates during a 13-year 
cultural ethnography, observing as the bankers heeded 
or ignored the cues their bodies gave about the limits 
of feasible demands. The article as a whole offers an 
illustration of the value of Greco’s reflections for offering 
a fresh and valuable perspective on the concept of 
coping.
InTroduCTIon
Bringing together two decades of writing and elabo-
ration, Greco1 argues against two widespread posi-
tions: the idea of the multiplicity of bodily processes 
as without values or preferences, mere object rather 
than participant; and the idea of human agents as 
unitary, self-regulating choosers—unless ill. This, 
Greco suggests, is a false opposition. She proposes 
that we consider the possibility of bodies them-
selves, and bodily events such as illness, expressing 
values, aims and socially meaningful preferences. 
From this perspective, the concept of ‘psychoso-
matics’ takes on new colour. The term refers to 
more than the status of certain physical symptoms 
that are ‘medically unexplained’; it comes to refer 
to a domain of inquiry in which the anatomical, 
biophysical, social body is active as participant both 
in and beyond the production of symptoms. Such 
a perspective has special value in highlighting the 
zone between activity and passivity in the selec-
tion and stabilisation of our responses. Likewise, 
the domain of psychosomatics sketched by Greco, 
calls us to attend to the lag or mismatch between 
bodily participation and the social ‘self ’, and how 
this discrepancy is implicated in the relation of 
behaviour and perception. Greco’s approach has 
roots in Canguilhem2 and Foucault,3 and is aligned 
with productive scholarship in a variety of domains, 
ranging from studies of physical coordination, pain 
and fatigue in sport,4 to critical disability studies,5 
archaeological studies of ageing,6 phenomenolog-
ical philosophy7 and feminist studies of endocri-
nology.8–10 Yet despite such strands of scholarship, 
in general there is still anxiety in the humanities 
about thinking bodily participation beyond the 
agentic subject, a residual tendency to think about 
embodiment as an effect.
This is especially true within discussions of 
biopolitics. Although there are clear exceptions,11 
the body often appears as object or as a surface for 
inscription. One significant implication of Greco’s 
position is that it especially highlights the strate-
gies through which human biological processes are 
managed in the context of wider relations of power 
and governance. Conventionally, biopolitics is 
framed as a concern with how i) biological processes, 
as object, are ii) oriented towards particular polit-
ical goals iii) through modes of subjectivation, the 
production of certain kinds of desirable and unde-
sirable ‘kinds’ of people.12 13 Greco’s position, 
however, would highlight the need to intensify 
developments in thinking about biopolitics that give 
attention to how vital processes exceed biopolitical 
capture. Vital processes may conflict with extant 
modes of governance in the expression of values 
and aims. These processes themselves may also, in 
Greco’s account, incorporate, resignify and exploit 
the norms implicit in biopolitical governance.14
For Greco, then, the bodily processes may them-
selves participate in biopolitics within the sphere of 
the everyday and its practices. In this, Greco does 
not require any concept of the body as a coherent, 
unitary entity; her interest is rather in exploring the 
multifaceted nature of bodily life and its contribu-
tions to the points of coherence and incoherence 
in human subjectivity, forms of valuation and social 
practices. This perspective is aligned with the work 
of the American studies scholar and queer theorist 
Lauren Berlant, particularly in her reading of the 
novel Two Girls, Fat and Thin by Mary Gaitskill.15 
In a recent issue of Medical Humanities, Wasson16 
has pointed to the fruitfulness of Berlant’s thinking 
for conceptualising ‘the grinding down of vulner-
able subjects that occurs not through dramatic 
events but through structurally induced attrition’. 
In her interpretation of Gaitskill, Berlant assesses 
the kinds of embodied problems that may be 
solved or managed through participation in—or 
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refraining from participation in—thinking, eating or sex under 
such conditions of attrition. These are three activities that at first 
sight appear wildly different. Considering them together would 
appear to be an ‘outrageous proposition’.17 Superficially, all 
that they seem to have in common is their structure of desire: 
the subject wishes to have the sexual object, the edible object, a 
thought. Although in such an account, the body serves merely as 
a unitary instrument or ancillary of the wish, to be disciplined in 
the achievement of the object of desire.
It is true that eating, thinking and sex are fundamental sites of 
self-governance. In this regard, bodily processes are an genre of 
object to be disciplined by the subject, to be marshalled in their 
potentialities to form effective human capital, amid unravelling 
arrangements of reciprocity and institutions. This is the familiar 
position of the body within many discussions of biopolitics. But, 
additionally, eating, thinking and sex are also embodied activi-
ties that can be deployed for making days that feel emotionally 
bearable, less poisonous for a time. For Berlant, these survival 
strategies can be conceived as negotiations with biopolitics, 
as ‘laboratories for an ongoing question of how life might be 
structured’ (p. 104).18 What marks eating, thinking, sex as a set 
for Berlant is that at times each can function as a part-active, 
part-passive strategy in which the intensities of bodies-in-envi-
ronments are modulated into a felt state. All three activities hold 
out the prospect of making us feel less powerless, scattered and 
small in ourselves—even if in a sense their enactment contributes 
to our powerlessness, and we may know this. Bodily processes 
are irreducibly important participants here, if the goal of the 
practices is an embodied affect. In the latter part of the article, 
Berlant’s analysis will be placed into conversation with ethno-
graphic observations over 13 years by Alexandra Michel of the 
process of physical burnout in investment banking associates. 
Whereas Berlant explores the participation of the body within 
strategies to make more bearable days, Michel documents the 
irruption of the body in ways that are so predictable that they 
form part of the expectable arc of labour within work-inten-
sive, results-driven industries. Both, however, illuminate the 
body’s preferences and values that operate at the ground level of 
biopolitics. In this, Berlant and Michel offer helpful illustration, 
across quite different media and contexts, of the value of Greco’s 
perspective as applied to reflecting on what is entailed by coping.
EATIng, ThInkIng And sEx In Two Girls, FaT and Thin
As a first source for thinking about participating bodies within 
the conduct of coping, we will consider Berlant’s reading of 
three survival strategies within Gaitskill’s15 novel, and the role 
they play in offering access to an embodied feeling of resilience, 
if not necessarily the capacity to make better traction in the 
world. Although there is a wide literature debating the merits 
of the concept of resilience as a scholarly tool,19 20 Berlant’s 
analysis is unusual in attending to practices that have their goal 
the embodied feeling of some kind of ‘resilience’ (or, as Berlant 
sometimes puts it, ‘reprieve’). This terrain is almost always 
bypassed by discussions of ‘resistance’ in the social sciences and 
humanities, which retain an image of choice-making, severed 
from its conditions of possibility. In this way, the strategic aspects 
of embodied feeling remain too often out of focus, despite their 
contribution to the range of practices through which power and 
subjectivity are negotiated.21
The two protagonists of Gaitskill’s15 novel are Justine and 
Dorothy. Early in the novel, we learn that both live with memo-
ries of traumatic abuse and neglect from their childhoods. Justine 
was abused by a friend of her father’s when she was aged 5 years; 
Dorothy experienced repeated abuse from her father until she 
left home, beginning at age 14. The plot centres around an inter-
view Justine conducts with Dorothy, who had served for a time 
as secretary to Anna Granite (a loosely fictionalised Ayn Rand). 
However, centre-stage in the book are the strategies the protag-
onists both use, despite their significant differences from one 
another, in responding to and coping with their experience of 
‘a subtle, turbulent, cockeyed and exhausting world’ (p. 32).15 
Each helps ‘organise life to lessen the impact’ (p. 112).15 For 
individuals well-ensconced within the conventional family form, 
eating, thinking and sex might well be integrated and tangled 
together in taken-for-granted, invisible routines of intimacy. As 
such, Berlant22 notes that one of the paradoxical possibilities of a 
novel is to dramatise the disaggregation of such practices. Specif-
ically, she argues that the isolation experienced by Justine and 
Dorothy in Two Girls, Fat and Thin means that the strategies are 
articulated and distinguished, making their functioning clearer. 
Justine works for a doctor, Dorothy for a law firm (p. 77)22; 
observes that Gaitskill formulates their depictions as each a ‘case 
study’. The bleakness and extremity of their lives, as depicted by 
Gaitskill, helps to focus, highlight and burnish their practices of 
coping for the reader.
Eating
The title of the book highlights food consumption as the form 
of coping most centrally in focus. Dorothy responds to repeated 
experiences of rape by her father in ways that hold tight to the 
goodness of food, against the threats of the world. Mentally, 
"I hugged the inner me to myself at night and thought how I 
had enjoyed dinner, no matter what" (p. 117).15 Physically, “I 
stopped brushing my teeth, except on rare occasions. All at 
once, I hated putting the paste-laden brush into my nice warm 
mouth" (p. 60).15 By contrast, Justine reduces her claims on 
the world, with a methodical reserve. She takes little pleasure 
from food, and her thin body participates in the performance 
of a pretty, ‘good girl’. Although consciously she knows that it 
is harmful for her health, Justine ‘could not make herself eat 
nutritionally sound food’ and ‘the eating of meals had somehow 
become burdensome to her’ (p. 278).15 When we do see Justine 
eat, ‘her stomach felt too tight even for chewed-up mouthfuls of 
salad, and she ate uncomfortably’ (p. 225).15 Berlant’s account 
of the food practices of Justine and Dorothy is complex, and has 
often been misunderstood by commentators.23 There are three 
common simplifications. A first is that Justine’s constriction 
of food and Dorothy’s appetite are merely physical qualities, 
without bearing for them as subjects. A second simplification 
is that these behaviours are conscious ‘coping strategies’, in the 
manner described by Lazarus and Folkman24 selected by Justine 
and Dorothy as purposeful, self-aware actors in response to their 
appraisal of the needs of the situation, such that they could easily 
talk about their actions and their causes. A third simplification is 
that the food practices are reducible to symptoms of childhood 
trauma, as expressions of mental illness. Part of the complexity 
of Berlant’s position is that she does not think that these 
accounts are simply wrong. It is true that there is a disjuncture 
or lag between weight and subjectivity, so one cannot be read 
off from the other. It is also true that the inhibition or consump-
tion of food has a strategic quality in making more bearable days 
for the protagonists, and sometimes they know quite well what 
they are doing. And it is also true that the strategies evolved in, 
and initially responded to, the context of childhood suffering, 
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Yet Berlant22 argues that these three interpretations are facets 
of a deeper logic. For Gaitskill’s15 protagonists, food practices 
serve as a domain in which embodied processes are actively 
participating in the work of coping through modulating inter-
change between subject and world: 'for the girls, eating is a tech-
nique for pulling the world in and pushing it away according 
to their own terms and sense of pacing. It is neither an act of 
conscious intentional Agency, not a manifestation of unconscious 
symptoms’ (p. 86).22 It 'is a way of both being and not being in 
the world, giving the girls leverage to engage in exchange and 
to withdraw from sharing anything with just anyone’ (p. 83).22 
Gaitskill is highly attentive to the meanings of eating practices, 
and of not eating, aware of our rich emotional investment in 
what we do not do. Whereas everyday life offers little pleasure 
or acknowledgement to either Justine or Dorothy, eating or 
not eating express and defend their desire to find a space in the 
world. Justine’s body participates in producing both the pride 
and the cool, relieving numbness evoked by self-denial and 
neglecting herself, with an affective quality somewhere between 
fear and achievement.25 26 Dorothy’s body participates in 
‘creating a force field around her, seeming to neutralise what… 
might come from others—curiosity or attachment’ (p. 77).22 
They pity one another for the price attached to the other’s use 
of food, and what it harms or inhibits. But each also admires 
what eating or not eating contains and organises for the other, 
physically and emotionally. Justine finds herself torn between 
contempt and admiration for Dorothy: 'The hell of it was, the 
fat woman was obviously very strong in some way. She had that 
craziness locked into formation, doing drills, getting her up and 
out and moving’ (p. 189).15
Berlant22 argues that part of our investment in Justine and 
Dorothy’s use of food is a sense of recognition, even if this 
usage may be more extreme and desperate than the reader’s. 
Berlant argues that, not just Gaitskill’s15 characters but for her 
readers too, 'food is one of the few spaces of controllable, reli-
able pleasure people have… At the same time that one builds a 
life the pressures of its reproduction can be exhausting. Eating 
can be seen as a form of ballast against wearing out, but also 
as a counter- dissipation, in that, like other small pleasures, it 
can produce an experience of self-abeyance, of floating side-
ways’ (pp. 115–116).22 In bodily participation in what and when 
to eat, the activity can provide precisely a kind of rest for the 
self, 'an interruption of being good, conscious and intentional 
that feels like a relief… and enable[s] people to feel more resil-
ient in the everyday. This sense of resilience is different from 
actual resilience: bodies wear out from the pleasures that help 
them live on’ (pp. 26–27).27
In conceptualising the pleasures of eating or not eating, and 
how this helps bodies get through the day, Berlant invokes the 
concept of ‘self-medication’. The concept comes from theories of 
health behaviour, and is associated with the argument that food 
can be used as a form of self-soothing, especially when other 
forms of self-regulation such as social support are unavailable or 
would be difficult or emotionally costly to access.28 The concept 
of self-medication is invoked by behavioural scientists to interpret 
research findings linking trauma experiences to sustained over-
eating or undereating, in both clinical and community samples. 
For instance, Mason et al29 asked a US-based community sample 
of participants about their mental health and their eating prac-
tices. The researchers found that experiences of finding oneself 
eating without wishing to were neatly associated, in a dose-re-
sponse relationship, with the number of lifetime post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms. That two-thirds of the sample 
had at least one lifetime symptom of PTSD, suggested to the 
researchers that this is not a minority process associated with the 
most traumatised individuals, but a continuum on which most 
people are situated by degrees. Berlant30 agrees with the behav-
ioural science literature that eating does seem to be a strategy 
that helps manage some kind of problem, and that there are both 
‘usual’ and ‘catastrophic’ ends of the spectrum in the deployment 
of this strategy. However, whereas the behavioural science liter-
ature tends to imagine self-medication through eating as helping 
hold a damaged subject together (p. 115)22 offers an additional 
interpretation, seeing the pleasure and work of coping offered 
by eating and of not eating ‘as a kind of self-medication through 
self-interruption'.
Justine wants herself to eat; Dorothy is baffled that she finds 
herself eating. There is a lag or mismatch between the body’s 
evaluation of food and the subject’s. Berlant’s22 reading of the 
novel suggests that food practices offer some ease or break for 
Justine and Dorothy from the burdens of subjectivity, through 
the participation of bodily processes. This participation is shaped 
and made more intense by experiences of trauma and adversity, 
which through social, psychological and endocrinal process may 
draw the psychosomatic organism towards self-medication prac-
tices. Berlant is clear both i) that eating and not eating can be 
fuelled in part by forms of trauma, which can shape and alter the 
body’s values and preferences and ii) that this does not reduce 
eating in any simple way to an effect of the trauma. For Berlant, 
eating is an embodied practice, recruited and personalised to help 
organise and interrupt the social, economic and psychological 
problems that surface for the subject within their everyday life. 
Preferred responses are potentiated by social structures, resource 
availability, individual projects as well as by the repertoires and 
dispositions of the organism. For Berlant the very different rela-
tionships with food that Justine and Dorothy dramatise, in the 
aftermath of trauma, highlight that eating needs to be considered 
for what problems it helps solve or manage for a person-as-or-
ganism, to understand its locatedness and tenacity.
Thinking
A second strategy identified by Berlant in Two Girls, Fat and 
Thin is thinking about the world, monitoring it. ‘Like eating’ 
(p. 87)22 observes, ‘monitoring appears to control the shape 
and pacing of exchange’. Thinking as an activity gets given a 
heavy emotional load for Justine and Dorothy, more than they 
seem to want or expect from it. Part of this load comes from the 
fact that, like our bodies, thinking promises not to withdraw or 
abandon us, since it is us—although naturally this promise may 
be betrayed. Across Gaitskill’s writings, this is a common theme. 
For instance, describing Joel in Bad Behaviour (p. 8)31 writes: 
"He could feel his eyes become clouded with privacy as he 
slipped discretely into a sheltering cave of sexual fantasy. His 
focus wobbled. He slipped out again". Turning attention to 
thoughts, whether private fantasy or surveillance of the world or 
absorption in a book, is treated by Gaitskill as making a recess 
within the streaming of experience, within which that streaming 
can eddy; it allows internal space to be a destination, rather than 
in the moment feeling the need for objects and destinations from 
the environments.32 This permits intense investment in guarded 
thoughts without expression or with minimal expression. Just 
like eating or not eating, thinking—or, at times, concertedly not 
thinking—are practices that enable for Justine and Dorothy the 
embodied affect of affectionate contempt for the world, a great 
buffer for difficult, unpredictable and exhausting days.
As Savransky33 has observed, our familiar frames of refer-
ence for conceptualising thinking are as the expression of the 
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sovereign, rational self or as something we passively have and 
undergo. Both frames of reference more or less approximate 
our experience at times. But neither adequately accounts for the 
contexts and conditions of thinking. In particular, everyday life 
repeatedly insists to each of us that bodily processes participate 
in the process of thinking, an observation that has long been 
basic for cultural theory and to the medical humanities34 35 and 
to work on embodied reading within literacy studies.36 37 There 
are physical states in which thinking is enlivened or deadened. 
An implication of Greco’s position on psychosomatic subjects 
is that endocrinal and nutritive processes shape and are shaped 
by the intensity, colour and direction of our thoughts. Atten-
tion to the affects of psychosomatic strategies such as eating 
and thinking point to the participation of non-representational, 
underspecified but nonetheless meaningful and evaluative 
responses by the body to the environment. Berlant makes an 
acute point well aligned with Greco’s perspective when she urges 
us to 'think about the way energy drinks, sugar, and caffeine 
fuel the process of simply getting by. Think of the imperative to 
focus amidst distraction, and the imperative to stay in a decent 
mood. Working the workday requires fatigue management, effi-
ciency and affective labour at work and later at home’ (p. 28).27 
Certainly, the body that contributes to the experience and effect 
of stimulants is always in part a social construction, depending 
on their context, branding and other forms of discursive loca-
tion. However, the properties of the body, and its resourcing or 
depletion, make a contribution to this construction—according 
to both theory2 38–40 and the results of randomised placebo-con-
trolled research in psychopharmacology.41 42
Greco and Savransky43 draw an important distinction between 
three concepts that are usually elided: care of the self, technology 
of the self and practice of freedom. Foucault and  Rabinow 
p. 225)44 define technologies of the self as 'techniques by which 
individuals effect … a certain number of operations on their own 
bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to 
transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happi-
ness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality". Eating and 
thinking practices are often recruited as technologies of the self. 
But in Gaitskill,15 they do not serve that function. They are not 
strategies for developing the self, although development may or 
may not be a byproduct. They are, however, profound practices 
of the care of the self, as forms of coping. And the freedom that 
they offer is not in the first instance an escape from modes of 
domination, but freedom from the relentlessness of the tired-
ness and powerlessness of being oneself. Justine and Dorothy 
are not seeking to make themselves better through their eating 
and thinking practices, but to feel each day as more bearable. 
In Greco’s38 terms, biological individuals are never entirely 
isolated, and yet an organism is identifiable as such by its partial 
capacity to maintain its own difference and modes of norma-
tivity. In short, the body irreducibly participates in this process in 
pulling the world in and pushing it away, as eating and thinking 
or their inhibition support the attempt to feel resilient in the 
moment, sometimes against the social ambitions and desires of 
the subject herself.
sex
Finally, a third strategy identified by Berlant in Two Girls, Fat and 
Thin is the use of sex. This strategy operates somewhat differ-
ently to the other two in the novel. Eating and thinking open up 
‘an infinite domain… directed towards an enigmatic somewhere. 
In contrast, what the girls value most about sex is its unorigi-
nality’ (p. 94).22 For Justine and Dorothy sex is so saturated by 
conventions that it offers the prospect of the feeling of embodied 
resilience precisely by providing a chance to be invisible within 
the body. In our society, Berlant argues 'conventionality in the 
penumbra of sex provides relief from the ordinary muddles that 
arise in the intimate zones of encounter with other persons and 
the world’ (p. 6).18 We offer others only what we expect they 
can stand, and in doing so we make space for bodily processes 
to participate as embodied intensities organise all that is desir-
able and concerning about intimacy. Berlant argues that, within 
these parameters, sex is little about achieving fulfilment from the 
object, and much more a space of relationality in which hopes, 
expectations and anxieties about intimacy are negotiated to 
make them less unbearable. Yes, sex in the novel is destabilising 
for Justine and Dorothy. But, in such cases, it may still be part 
of the work of coping: 'what counts as composure might be a 
conventional style of instability rather than an instability that 
actually threatens the subject’s core patterning’ (p. 93).22
Berlant observes that sex with love is such a powerful symbol in 
our culture, and specifically such a powerful symbol of simplicity, 
that this makes the use of sex to achieve other purposes, such as 
reprieve or detachment, relatively unacknowledged. She criti-
cises accounts of sexuality built around "some kind of hydrau-
lics of the drive, which I’m not at all sure is correct about the 
subject’s rise and fall of intensities. For example, I could want 
to want to have sex, but not feel like it, but put myself in the 
position to have it in order to generate the energy to spread out 
a little, to dismantle, without there being that sense of internal 
pressure implied in discharge".45 Mistaking sex as in the first 
instance as about desire, as the available terms of femininity 
encourage Justine and Dorothy to do, makes it difficult for them 
to acknowledge the normative cruelties and exploitation associ-
ated with the conventions that saturate sex for them. It makes 
them wonder a little why they are doing it, why they experience 
their bodies as pulling towards sex that they regret or would 
prefer not to repeat.
Indeed, Dorothy mainly finds sex a confusing, somewhat 
physically distant experience. Justine finds her body simultane-
ously pulling towards the closeness of sex and flinching away 
from the pain of sex, when as a subject she is feeling neither 
attraction nor repulsion but rather numb, worn and a bit deso-
late. Yet 'she recognised something compelling in it, a ghastly 
compulsion akin to that of a starving lab animal which will 
keep pressing the button that once supplied it with food, even 
though the button now jolts its poor small body with increasing 
doses of electric shock’ (p. 227).15 Attempting to understand 
the lag or mismatch between body and subject, Berlant argues 
that conventionalised modalities and their attendant emotional 
and/or physical pain are not beside the point for both Justine 
and Dorothy. They have intense investment in low-intensity 
sex. For the protagonists this kind of sex opens up a space of 
reciprocity through embodied unoriginality and, therefore, 
reprieve. However, like eating and thinking, Gaitskill is atten-
tive to the moments when sex as part of the work of coping 
starts to fail in this function. Justine and Dorothy’s experiences 
of reassuringly unoriginal sex offers modulation of exposure to 
the world. Nonetheless, sex risks leaving them more face to face 
with others than either intended or quite wanted, which is how 
the novel ends. Gaitskill’s15 ending emphasises that the strate-
gies adopted by her protagonists are no more than ways to cope, 
since to do more than cope would require resources, support 
and forms of control that they do not have. Yet, by the end, the 
book leaves open whether the operation of the three forms of 
coping has brought Justine and Dorothy together as ‘an attach-
ment that might become a solidarity that could produce more 
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and better traction in the world’ for each of them, some path 
towards thriving (p. 161).22
Looked at through Greco’s account of the psychosomatic 
subject, it is notable that in eating, thinking and sex the relation-
ship between subject, physicality and reality is made salient: the 
materiality and ephemerality of food; the subjective reality and 
material unreality of thoughts; sex as the truth of one’s being, 
or not. And in making this relationship salient, and inserting it 
against the other demands of a day, the self is permitted some 
feeling of reprieve, of not having been overturned by the world. 
Each is a strategy that is at once localised and with implications 
for the whole electrical grid of felt experience, no matter how 
difficult things might otherwise be. It is this that makes eating, 
thinking and sex both the basis for a sense of ordinariness, and 
something that punctuates the ordinary. This is suggested by 
Berlant’s attention to the ‘consumption of food and the produc-
tion of intense intellection’ which reveals that 'each, like sex, is a 
process of absorption and a way of being in the world, a way of 
bringing it in, entering it, and averting it. While optimistic, these 
habituated modes of being are also techniques of self-annihila-
tion and negation, ways of using the episodic pain of particular 
exchanges in order not, for a minute, to be that ordinary failed 
person, with that history’ (p. 81).22
In each strategy, practices are engaged in which the will 
becomes bendy or sleepy, out of focus and the body’s values, 
aims and preferences participate in producing the feeling of a 
less bad day. As Dorothy puts it, rather heartcatchingly: "I had 
enjoyed dinner, no matter what" (p. 117).15 The participation 
of bodily processes is highlighted by the fact that all three strat-
egies have as their goal, not the achievement of the object, but 
an embodied feeling. They are absolutely dependent on bodily 
participation, in a mode of activity that is sometimes conscious, 
sometimes unconscious but often neither strictly the expres-
sion or enactment of cognitive will nor involuntary and merely 
encountered. Notably, this account is aligned with the perspec-
tive that has increasingly been taken by the wider literature 
of coping research since Lazarus,46 in contrast to earlier work 
which presumed that coping strategies must be conscious expres-
sions of will. In part, this recognition in the coping literature has 
come from integration with work in developmental psychology, 
and the developmentalists’ insights into the origins of tacit or 
nonconscious processes. Likewise, examining at Gaitskill’s 
narration of the lives of Justine and Dorothy, Berlant is continu-
ally concerned to emphasise how these strategies are built devel-
opmentally, from childhood: for the protagonists, over time, 
each strategy comes to be ‘wound about her so completely she 
no longer knew it was there’ (p. 153).15 Most of the time the 
work of coping inhabits the region of life that is not surprising 
when it comes to attention but which ‘falls under the radar when 
someone asks you how your day was’.47
bodIly ATTrITIon
Shilling (p. 74)48 has observed that ‘in rejecting the negative 
aspects of naturalistic views’, scholars have ‘tended to neglect 
how the body forms a basis for, and contributes towards, social 
life’, although even he is not inclined to ascribe as much partic-
ipation to bodily processes as does Greco. True, unconscious 
dynamics have been highlighted by psychoanalytic approaches, 
and not-fully-conscious processes have been considered by 
phenomenology and affect theory. Yet in both cases, unconscious 
and affective processes are distinguished but then often reab-
sorbed by the subject, with bodily processes just along for the 
ride rather than as participant. This seems in part motivated by 
knee-jerk worries about sociobiology. The idea that biological 
processes could have values or preferences is seen as a natural-
istic fallacy, and a dangerous essentialism. And of course falla-
cious and essentialising treatments of biology do have such 
consequences, especially where a static and antiquated image of 
biology is invoked and where the body’s authority is invoked 
in various ways in making a particular message have the force 
of moral inevitability. However, this is by no means the only 
way of considering the psychosomatic.38 In the forms of coping 
under discussion here, the preferences of bodily processes are 
difficult to ignore, as an absurd amount of life is spent coaxing or 
inhibiting propensities to feel sleepy, empty, sharp, tossed about 
or exhilarated under certain conditions. As Greco’s work high-
lights, this activity of coaxing and inhibiting is important for the 
way that biological processes construe and interrupt modes of 
subjectivation, and hence the relationship between the subject 
and modes of governance and self-governance.
For instance, the capacity of firms and universities to focus 
their attention on minds and social relationships occurs on the 
basis of assumptions that subjects will take care of their own 
bodies within the everyday, keeping them from intruding on 
overcommitment and overwork, and focusing on mind and 
interpersonal successes when narrating the self. Greco1 cites 
Whitehead’s remark that, although mind/body dualism is reduc-
tionist and often unhelpful, we should not fail to do full justice 
to the positive achievements enabled by this outlook. There are 
unquestionably major advantages to environments that value 
people for their perspectives. Yet, at another level, an institu-
tional environment that disavows care for or valuation of the 
consequences for the overcommitted and overworked organism 
is a recipe for burnout. In fact, exhaustion and illness form part 
of the expected trajectory and selection process for workers in 
results-focused sectors like investment banking, academia and 
social work.49 50 Michel conducted a 13-year ethnography of two 
cohorts of Wall Street banking associates that effectively illus-
trates these processes, observing 'dualism in the wild’ (p. 67).51 
She criticises certain tendencies in theorists such as Marx and 
Foucault who sometimes focus too readily on how the body is 
disciplined by power, as a passive object. She reports that the 
body changed in its role as participant over time, such that 
descriptions of institutional logics of power orchestrating docile 
bodies could stand as relevant descriptions of entry into the 
workplace, but not of what happened over time.
In their first 3 years of work in the sector, Michel observes, 
bankers were intent on disciplining bodily processes and on 
denying or relativising the participation of bodies in their work:
When I asked bankers about physical needs such as sleep, they made 
stark distinctions between the body and the mind, giving priority to 
the mind, like the following Bank A vice president: “I totally believe 
in mind over matter. There are no such things as physical needs. Tell 
me one physical need and I can tell you a culture in which they have 
controlled it" (p. 54).51
They were supported in this bifurcating process by tactics 
deployed by their firms:
"Our most important currency is not time but energy. It is easy to 
keep people at work around the clock. Minds are willing. You have 
to fight the biology" (Bank В director). Senior bankers explained how 
the constant buzz of open floors' layout facilitated long hours because 
it impeded reflection and nervously stimulated bankers. The banks 
also offered food and caffeine at strategic times, namely, "when peo-
ple's blood sugar slumps and that gives you energy to keep going" 
(Bank A associate) (p. 319).52
copyright.
 on A












anities: first published as 10.1136/m
edhum




 129Duschinsky R, et al. Med Humanit 2019;45:124–130. doi:10.1136/medhum-2018-011581
original research
Yet by the fourth year, bankers started to mention the phys-
ical and biological needs in interviews with Michel without 
prompting. The interviews depicted the body as strangling 
subjects from the inside, choking their capacity to work or as 
taking revenge (p. 342).52 Michel, who had worked as an invest-
ment banker before entering academia, started to feel some of 
these familiar sensations as she tried to keep up with her partic-
ipants’ 100-hour work weeks as an ethnographer. She saw the 
rhythms of investment banking impacting her blood pressure, 
emotional responses and sentence length when writing.53 From 
her longitudinal ethnographic work with her participants, she 
reports that some kind of physical breakdown was universal 
among the bankers in her sample between their fourth and sixth 
year in the sector:
Starting in year 4, the bankers’ bodies started to break down under 
overwork, causing bankers’ self-narratives to change. The body now 
became a frequent theme. Its role changed from that of an unprob-
lematic object to being a hostile antagonist. Between years 4 and 6 all 
bankers had proceeded to this stage, which I refer to as "body-as-an-
tagonist". Committed to their work, bankers responded to the body’s 
rebellion by pushing harder to maintain performance. Starting in 
year 6, for about 40 percent of bankers, the breakdowns were so 
severe that they had to give up fighting their bodies (p. 53).51
Some bankers stopped fighting low energy and heeded it as 
a cue, and came to recognise the physical fallout of inactivity 
and prolonged sitting (and, paradoxically, for some the fallout 
of treating exercise like investment banking, and pursuing it 
without pity or respite). Michel52 observes that in some cases 
this change of attitude contributed to creative work strategies 
and greater compassion to colleagues that, in fact, benefited the 
banks, although Michel observes that their colleagues mocked 
these participants as weak. Some bankers facing breakdown 
entered cycles, oscillating between rest and kicking their bodies 
into action, working yet longer hours to compensate and treating 
symptoms like back pain and insomnia as just background noise. 
And some bankers left the sector, although Michel was surprised 
that the transition changed little for these workers in their rela-
tionship with their bodies, as they kept to some version of their 
old routines. From the sixth year onwards, Michel (p. 348)52 
noted a change in the banker’s use of the ‘I’ pronoun: whereas 
before they implicitly meant their mind when they said ‘I’, expe-
riences of physical breakdown caused disruptions that distanced 
themselves from and objectified a mind unable to sufficiently 
control the production of symptoms. They described entering 
into negotiation with their bodies: "I see my body is a friend 
who has always supported me as best as she could, ignored her. 
I always thought so highly of my mind, but it has let much more 
often than my body" (Vice President of Bank B) (p. 350).52
Michel’s account is of one kind of high-strain workplace. 
Public health researchers have also documented the predictable 
health consequences of other kinds of high-strain working envi-
ronments, such as precarious employment and perceived job 
insecurity.54 Workplace demands can contribute to embodied 
responses, most notably discomfort and pain, that interrupt the 
subject’s efforts as contractor of their labour. As Michel observes, 
these might be understood as mere noise, without integral rele-
vance to the subject. However, they can also be understood as 
cues that the organism is approaching certain limits.55
Michel’s discussions of the role of participating bodies in the 
thresholds of sustainability for the workplace chimes with the 
biopolitics of everyday life displayed in the three strategies—
eating, thinking and sex—highlighted by Berlant’s analysis. In 
each case, Berlant examines the psychosomatic domain of coping 
and surviving, in which bodies express values, aims and socially 
meaningful preferences. The same can be said of whether and 
how Justine and Dorothy dress, drink tea, hug themselves for 
comfort, regulate their breathing to stay calm, attempt to sleep, 
travel around the city, arrange things around their apartments—
other psychosomatic survival strategies in Two Girls, Fat and 
Thin,15 although these are not discussed explicitly by Berlant. 
In each, bodily participation and preferences in engagement, 
estrangement and exchange with the world serve as a technique 
through which exposure to experience is modulated through 
the participation of the body in the interruption of the subject. 
They contribute as part of the ground-level processes of biopo-
litical governance, but without necessarily producing a coherent 
subject-position in the manner that many discussions of biopolit-
ical governance suppose.
ConClusIon
For the protagonists of Gaitskill’s Two Girls, Fat and Thin,15 
and Berlant18 22 argues for its readers, strategies such as eating, 
thinking and sex contribute to a feeling of resilience, interrupting 
the terms of insertion into the day. Whereas for Gaitskill’s 
protagonists, bodily processes participate in the characters’ 
modulation of intensities and interruption of self-sovereignty 
to achieve the feeling of resilience, among Michel’s research 
participants, the psychosomatic body signals limits to what can 
be demanded of the organism by results-oriented work. In the 
latter case, a variety of bodily processes interrupt the bankers’ 
attempts to maintain discipline and self-sovereignty. Some recog-
nise these as cues regarding the limits beyond which further 
demands will be costly, others just attempt to push on through. 
As such, a contrast lies in the fact that Berlant emphasises the 
participation of the body in the work of coping through the 
production of felt resilience, whereas Michel documents ways 
that bodily processes may participate in signalling approach 
to what is bearable or sustainability. Yet both analyses have in 
common that they highlight the participation of the multiplicity 
of bodily processes and the organism’s modulation of intensities 
in the domain of everyday biopolitics. Bodily processes are active 
in stimulating and shaping responses to constraints and environ-
ments, and their ensuring pain and pleasure, aims and shames, 
discipline and leisure. This participation does not entail a natu-
ralistic fallacy in which ‘the body must be listened to’, echoing 
the trope of the wise body pulling towards how things should 
be. The eating practices of Justine and Dorothy are hardly ones 
that will contribute to their long-term health; the symptoms of 
Michel’s bankers signal the potential for burnout, but do not in 
themselves possess normative force. Both Gaitskill’s characters 
and Michel’s participants enter and exit awareness, depending on 
what else is going on for them, that there is a trade-off between 
their long-term physical health and the needs of another equi-
librium which is experienced as more pressing. Justine is in fact 
pulled in both directions by her body in relation to sex: wanting 
harmful sex and wanting also to escape. The participation of 
bodily processes, even in the work of coping, depend on what 
values are assigned to health and to a life.
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